ABSTRACT Multimodal data can be used to gain additional perspective on a phenomenon. For applications, such as security and the detection of suspicious activity, the need to aggregate and analyze data from multiple modes is vital. Recent research in suspicious behavior detection has introduced methods for identifying and scoring dense blocks in multivariate tensors, which are consistent indicators of suspicious activity. None yet, however, have proposed a method for the merging and analysis of multiple modes of data for suspicious behavior, especially when the set of items described in each data set do not match-that is, the data is partially paired-which is common when data sets originate from different sources. Neither has a method been described for dealing with the similar case of incomplete data. This paper introduces a technique for multimodal data analysis for suspicious activity detection when the data are only partially paired and/or incomplete. The method is applied to synthetic and real data, demonstrating strong precision and recall even in poorly paired cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the manner that humans use information gathered from multiple senses such as sight, sound, and touch to understand the world around them, a more complete understanding of an observable phenomenon can be achieved by collecting information about that phenomenon through different data acquisition frameworks, or modes. For instance, a motionbased gaming system which receives input from the physical movement of the player may benefit from several different sensors. The UTD-MHAD dataset [1] includes four modes for such a scenario: color video, depth video, skeletal joint position, and inertial sensor signals. It is easy to imagine how the analysis of these four modes in conjunction would offer greater potential accuracy than any one mode analyzed independently.
Multimodal datasets such as UTD-MHAD are ideal because they are collected in a carefully controlled environment. Designed specifically for use in research and experimentation, they offer the highest assurances in quality and completeness. But as is painfully known, data collected in less rigorous environments do not have these guarantees. Particularly relevant for multimodal data analysis is that modes may be gathered from different sources. Indeed, part of the allure of multimodal analysis is discovering otherwise-unrevealed patterns by reaching across and combining sources from different domains, but this comes at a cost in convenience. Most notably, different sources are unlikely to contain data on the same entities. An analysis of social media usage by combining users' Facebook and Twitter data would be incomplete since not everyone on Facebook has a Twitter account and vice versa, an example partially paired data. It is desirable then to find techniques and algorithms that can work in spite of this limitation.
One area of research that has benefited from the advantages offered by multimodal data is the detection of suspicious activity. In the field of computer security, Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) products conduct a form of multimodal analysis by aggregating and analyzing data collected from security devices, networks, servers, and applications to identify threats. Broadly, we define ''suspicious activity'' as activity that differs from expected behavior. Recent research into the detection of suspicious activity has focused primarily on the identification of dense blocks in data when represented as a tensor.
What does this mean, and why is this suspicious? Suppose a dataset collected from Twitter's Streaming APIs contains for a number of tweets a user ID, tweet ID, and time. This can be represented by a 3-dimensional tensor with each variable (user ID, tweet ID, and time) corresponding to a dimension. A tweet by twitterUser100 at 12:54 pm would be represented by a mark in the appropriate cell in the tensor. Anyone who retweeted this tweet would have a mark at the cell with the same tweet ID, under their user ID and the time they retweeted. In the case of illegitimate retweet boosting, when a tweet is artificially retweeted at a high volume by bot accounts, it is expected that the tensor would contain a dense block of bot users posting the same tweet ID within a short time period. This behavior is also seen in other instances of suspicious activity such as DDoS attacks and false reviews for products or businesses. These dense blocks are suspicious because they are a natural consequence of the fact that the perpetrators have to maximize impact with limited resources. Limited time and limited fake accounts generate abnormally heavy activity in a dense block, the hallmark of suspicious behavior.
The application of multimodal data, where multiple datasets containing different perspectives on some entity are fused, can only serve to strengthen the potential for existing methods to detect suspicious activities. For matters such as national security there is a notable gain to be had in merging otherwise disconnected sets of data together to identify potential threats from every angle. No method yet gives a solution for processing multimodal, multivariate, partially paired data, which is a virtual requirement when data come from different sources. This paper seeks to propose such a solution that can open the door for significantly more powerful suspicious activity detection.
To summarize our contributions, (1) we propose the problem of uncovering suspicious activity in partially paired or incomplete multimodal data, (2) we extend the existing axioms for evaluating a suspiciousness metric to consider unknown values and propose a metric that satisfies them, and (3) we present an algorithm for detecting suspicious blocks in data of this nature.
The remaining sections of the paper are dedicated in the following manner. In Section 2, we survey and discuss related work on suspicious activity detection and partially paired data processing. Section 3 is devoted to developing a metric for evaluating the suspiciousness of a block in a multimodal, partially paired dataset, identifying and satisfying necessary axioms for an effective metric, while Section 4 describes an algorithm for applying the metric to find such blocks. In Section 5 we apply the metric and algorithm to synthetic and real world data and analyze the results, and finally we conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK A. SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR DETECTION
On the topic of suspicious behavior pattern detection, Prakash et al. [2] uncovered a consistent pattern in a class of sparse social graphs, which they labeled EigenSpokes. Also along the lines of pattern detection, Beutel et al. [3] tackled illegitimate behavior on social networks by detecting lockstep Page Likes on Facebook with a method they termed CopyCatch. Jiang et al. [4] described detection scenarios using security techniques. They identified three main categories of detection methods: supervised, clustering, and graph-based methods. The authors further suggest future directions for research in suspicious behavior detection, highlighting behavior-driven approaches.
Allen et al. [5] introduced a provenance system, PLUS, useful for assessing trust and suspicious behavior in data collaboration. Detection requires human analysis, and the authors call for research on automating the detection process. Jiang et al. [6] proposed a method, CatchSync, to find the giveaways of fraudulent behavior, namely synchronized behavior and unusual behavior. It does not require manual analysis and is scalable, parameterless, and side-information oblivious. Additionally, Mookiah et al. [7] presented a graphbased anomaly detection approach for detecting suspicious behavior, proceeding to call for a ranking algorithm for suspicious behaviors. Meanwhile, Kaur and Singh [8] proposed the use of brokerage values and other graph metrics to greatly reduce the number of undetected or misclassified anomalies compared to existing techniques.
Regarding modeling social media with statistical relational learning, Rao et al. [9] proposed a framework called SocialKB, based upon Markov logic networks, for modeling social media posts and identifying individual suspicious posts.
Jiang et al. [10] and [11] presented CrossSpot, an algorithm for dense block detection in multimodal tensors. Unusually dense blocks in multimodal tensors are generally consistent with illegitimate activity. CrossSpot makes use of a probabilistic metric for numerically evaluating the suspiciousness of a block. However, CrossSpot operates only on multimodal data for which values on all variables are known. For multimodal data that is aggregated from multiple sources, this is an unlikely case. To handle such data, preprocessing must be performed that may have an adverse effect, such as listwise deletion of all incomplete records.
B. SPAM DETECTION
Several frameworks for spam detection have been proposed. Hu et al. [12] proposed a framework for spammer detection on social media based on sentiment analysis. Toward the same end, Shehnepoor et al. [13] proposed a framework called NetSpam utilizing spam features to map spam detection into a classification problem. NetSpam is graph-based and incorporates metapaths. Thanigaivelan et al. [14] proposed a distributed anomaly detection system to be used in Internet of Things based on propagation of control messages through a network.
There are a variety of other methods and approaches towards spam detection. Xu et al. [15] apply spam detection to text messaging spam by proposing a service-side solution utilizing graph data mining to tell spammers and nonspammers apart. It is particularly advantageous in that it does not require the checking of the message contents. Enache and Patriciu [16] also introduced the idea of using swarm intelligence to detect web spam. Chengzhang and Kang [17] proposed multiple scoring methods to find spamming stores and sources of fake reviews in online marketplaces. This requires human evaluation after the scores are generated. Later on, Li et al. [18] proposed a method to detect fake shopping reviews online which also requires human input and evaluation. Alternatively, Zamil et al. [19] proposed a system which focuses on multiple spam related behaviors on the network by monitoring network traffic. Eshraqi et al. [20] suggested a clustering algorithm for detecting spam in Twitter. This method distinguishes itself from most previous methods, which utilized classification algorithms.
In an effort to use features to detect spam, Mateen et al. [21] proposed a technique using text-based and graph-based features for identification of spam users on social media. Along the same lines, Wang et al. [22] proposed a spam detection approach combining text and network features to make a feature vector. They distinguished spam microblogs from genuine ones by using a machine learning support vector machine. Regarding extracting these features, Park et al. [23] proposed a modified version of Bayesian network classifiers to adapt existing email spam detection techniques for social networks. Their proposal for collecting various features such as behavior, trust, and common interest could be updated for social network users. They also called for future research on real world applications of the classifiers. Additionally, Shen and Liu [24] proposed a method integrating feature extraction from several sources, including text, social network structure, and labeled data, into a single classifier.
C. OTHERS
On the subject of partially paired data, Kuan and Huang [25] proposed a new approach based on the weighted Z-test and p-values pooling to combine probabilities in a partially paired experimental design. Additionally, Guo and Yuan [26] reviewed and compared nine methods for analyzing partially paired data. Datta et al. [27] described local peer to peer data mining algorithms. They focused on localized algorithms with limited overhead on communication. Chen and Saad [28] proposed an efficient method for identifying dense subgraphs in relatively sparse graphs for purposes of community detection. Cichocki et al. [29] illustrated that higher-order tensors enable computation with of a more general nature and greater flexibility than that of matrix-based analysis.
III. SUSPICIOUSNESS METRIC
Here we discuss the structure of a tensor for multimodal and partially paired data, consider the criteria behind a metric for evaluating the suspiciousness of a block in such a tensor, and propose a metric that meets these criteria. To facilitate a common understanding, it is worthwhile first to provide the definition of multimodal data as used in our paper.
Definition 1: Multimodal data. Multimodal data is data obtained by combining the variables describing a phenomenon from multiple acquisition frameworks, also known as modes. Figure 1 illustrates a multimodal dataset for tweets consisting of three modes: Twitter streaming data, network information, and device information.
In addition, we also list the symbols used in our paper to describe a tensor and their definitions in Table 1 .
A. THE MULTIMODAL TENSOR FOR PARTIALLY PAIRED DATA
When the number of modes in our dataset = 1, a tensor for describing this data is trivial. Consider data collected from Twitter's Streaming API consisting of three variables: User ID, Tweet ID, and Time. A single mode, k-variable dataset is represented as a k-dimensional tensor where k=3. A block can be then be understood as a subtensor consisting of a subset of values for each variable.
To extend this design to a multimodal dataset, we must consider if every entity is described in every mode. Suppose we were to obtain network and device information for a number of tweets containing the originating IP address and city of every tweet as depicted in Figure 1 . In the spirit of multimodality, we aggregate these modes into a 3-mode dataset. Should every tweet described in each mode also be described by every other mode, we can combine the variables, forming in this case a 5-variable tensor. Then we can easily proceed with our work without any further processing of the data. The problem of interest arises when we consider multimodal data where not all entities are described by all modes. This would mean some entities would be unable to be placed in the tensor as they would be undefined on some dimensions. Figure 2 presents such a scenario, where the middle three VOLUME 5, 2017 entries are not defined on all three modes. A similar problem would be incomplete data, where a single mode multivariate dataset does not have values for all variables for all entries. The naive approach to handling these cases would be listwise deletion, where we remove all entities which are not described by one or more modes or variables. However, this betrays the purpose of multimodality to add to our analysis, not subtract from it. If we were to add a small collection of network information that contained only the IP addresses for five of the tweets obtained from the Streaming API, we would want to use this additional information to give additional insight, not to force removal of all entities except for those five. With that in mind, we seek a solution that allows us to retain all information.
To this end, we propose the addition of one row to each dimension to accommodate entities which do not have a value for the variable described by that dimension. In a 2-variable tensor (a matrix) this would mean the addition of one row and one column. Immediately this provides a way to place any entity into the tensor that is defined by any number of attributes. The task then is to devise a metric that can successfully evaluate the suspiciousness of blocks in this modified tensor. Figure 3 depicts an example of a 2-variable tensor with one dimension labeled by the letters A through F and the other labeled with the numbers 1 through 6. We may imagine this as multimodal data arising from the merging of two datasets, one containing letters and one containing numbers. In the example, two entities are described in the number dataset with values 3 and 3, but they are not described by the letter dataset, and there are three entities described in the letter dataset with values D, E, and E, but they are not described by the number dataset. These partially unknown entries are placed in the appropriate indexes for the dimensions that are defined and placed in the unknown row for those that are not.
B. METRIC PARAMETERIZATION
Jiang et al. [11] define the problem of formulating a suspiciousness metric as a function of four parameters, f (n, c, N, C) . This characterizes a subtensor of size n and mass c in the context of a tensor of size N and mass C. To extend this function to account for the possibility of partially paired data and unknown values, we divide parameter c into two: c 1 , the entries in Y defined for all variables, and counterpart c 0 , consisting of entries where one or more values are unknown, with c 1 + c 0 = c (note that when a tensor has no unknown values, c 1 = c). We do not divide parameter C because the notion of total mass in the tensor does not change based on the introduction of unknown values. This gives us our parameterization f (n, c 0 , c 1 , N, C) .
C. METRIC CRITERIA AND AXIOMS
To be an effective metric, Jiang et al. [11] identify five axioms that must hold true. It is important to note that the definition of mode used in their paper is analogous to that of a variable in ours, whereas a mode in our paper is a collection of data containing one or more variables.
Axiom 1 (Density): If there are two blocks of the same size in the same number of variables, the block of bigger mass is more suspicious than the block of less mass.
Axiom 2 (Size): If there are two blocks of the same density in the same number of variables, the bigger block is more suspicious than the smaller block Axiom 3 (Concentration): If there are two blocks of the same mass in the same number of variables, the smaller block is more suspicious than the bigger block.
Axiom 4 (Contrast): If two identical blocks lie in two tensors each of the same size but one is sparser, then the block in the sparser tensor is more suspicious.
Axiom 5 (Multimodal): A block which contains all possible values within a variable is just as suspicious as if that variable was ignored (was collapsed into the remaining variables).
In the case of partially paired data, there is an additional criteria that is important to ensure a metric is valuable:
Axiom 6 (Incomplete Entries): A block containing one or more partially unknown entries is at least as suspicious as if those entries were ignored.
Axiom 6 is necessary to ensure certain behavior we expect from processing incomplete data. Stemming from the notion that the inclusion of only partially known entries is valuable, the axiom guarantees that a block can only benefit from such entries belonging to it.
D. METRIC PROPOSAL
Jiang et al. [11] proposed a metric for evaluating the suspiciousness of completely known data: The metric is based on the probability that a block would have its mass if generated by an Erdös-Rényi-Poisson (ERP) model:
Definition 2: Erdös-Rényi-Poisson model.
Every value in a tensor X generated by the Erdös-Rényi-Poisson model is sampled from a Poisson distribution parameterized by the density of the tensor ρ:
The lower the probability, the higher the value of the metric. Thus if the ERP model describes a natural tensor, a suspicious block would be an unnaturally dense subtensor.
The task of adapting the metric should consider three requirements: (1) The metric must account for partially unknown entries and the designated unknown row on each dimension, (2) The metric must give the same value if there are no partially unknown entries, and (3) The metric must satisfy all six axioms.
To this end, given the parameterization f (n, c 1 , c 0 , N, C), we propose the following metric operable with multimodal, partially paired data:
The modification is deceptively simple. If we think of a subtensor Y as a subset of values on each variable
. . , v K nK }}, then a partially unknown entry e belongs in the subtensor if for all dimensions k that the entry has a value on, e k ∈ Y k . The number of entries described by this is c 0 . Alternatively, we can consider the unknown row on each dimension as always being a part of the subtensor and include it in the calculation of mass, but either way we do not include it in N or n. Revisiting Figure 3 , a 2×2 subtensor is highlighted within a 6×6 tensor (not a 3×3 subtensor within a 7×7 tensor). The value of c 1 is 11 and the value of c 0 is 5. Essentially, any partially unknown value we do not know for sure to be excluded from the subtensor is considered to be in the subtensor.
It is trivial to show that the two metrics are equivalent when there are no partially unknown entries.
Proof: From Eq. (2):
If there are no partially unknown entries, then c 0 = 0 and c 1 = c.
We now prove that the metric satisfies the six axioms enumerated above.
Axioms 1 through 5 are proven by Jiang et al. for the metric described in Eq. (1). We extend the proof of these five axioms to our metric by expressing Eq. (2) in the form of Eq. (1).
Consider an equivalent tensor with mass of fully known entries c 1 = c 1 + c 0 and mass of partly unknown entries c 0 = 0. Since c 1 + c 0 = c 1 + c 0 we can write:
Every tensor evaluable by Eq. (2) Our metric thus satisfies the requirements we set out to fulfill.
IV. ALGORITHM
With a metric for suspiciousness in place, we now discuss the task of devising an algorithm for detecting suspicious activity in a multimodal tensor with unknown values and propose an efficient algorithm for doing so.
A question to be answered is ultimately what the output of such an algorithm should be. In other words, what do we want to identify as suspicious? As noted, previous approaches have dealt with identifying individual entries, users (when they exist), and blocks. There is something to be said for each depending on the application. Our defined metric is primarily useful for evaluating the suspiciousness of blocks, which is advantageous over the other approaches in that it can identify groups of suspicion likely belonging to a single source. Therefore we focus on identifying suspicious blocks and the suspicious events contained within them. At this time, it is useful to redefine the block for use in the algorithm.
Definition 3: Block. A block B is a subset of the values on each dimension and/or the unknown row with the form
{{v 1 1 , v 1 2 , . . . , v 1 n1 }, {v 2 1 , v 2 2 , . . . , v 2 n2 }, . . . , {v k 1 , v k 2 , . . . , v K nK }}.
The values on dimension k of B are B k .
Note that while the unknown row is a potential element of a dimension in B from the algorithm view, it is never counted in N or n.
For simplicity we re-parameterize the suspiciousness function in terms of the block B and the tensor as block T :
Jiang et al. [11] presented CrossSpot for dense block detection in multimodal tensors. We modify their algorithm to introduce CrossSpot+, extending the functionality of the original algorithm to operate on partially paired data through incorporation of our proposed metric. Like CrossSpot, the algorithm is based on the manipulation of a block until it converges on a highest suspiciousness score. CrossSpot+ is detailed in Algorithm 1, and the associated sub-algorithm AdjustDim is shown in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm starts with a random seed block B and iterates through the dimensions of the tensor, selecting the Lemma 2: After running AdjustDim(k) the suspiciousness of B either remains the same or increases.
Proof: We denote the subset of values before and after AdjustDim(k) as B k and B k , and their respective blocks as B and B . Lemma 1 ensures that B k is optimal and therefore must result in a block at least as suspicious as the block with B k ; in other words, f (B , T ) ≥ f (B, T ).
Theorem 1: CrossSpot+ converges in finite time onto a local optimum suspicious block.
Proof: By Lemma 2, each iteration of AdjustDim(k) results in a block at least as suspicious as before. As there are a finite amount of subsets on each dimension, and by extension a finite amount of blocks, CrossSpot+ is guaranteed to converge in finite time.
Suppose that the block B returned by CrossSpot+ is not a local optimum suspicious block. Then there is some dimensionk such that Bk is not optimal. The convergence condition of CrossSpot+ ensures that B k = AdjustDim(k) for all k when B k are held constant for all k = k. By Lemma 1,k cannot exist and therefore B is optimal.
V. Experiments
To evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of CrossSpot+, we run experiments on both synthetic and real world data. The results indicate that CrossSpot+ is remarkably capable of detecting suspicious blocks with high precision and recall, even in extreme cases of poorly paired and highly incomplete data. It provides a significant improvement over CrossSpot with listwise deletion.
A. DATASETS
Five datasets are used to evaluate the algorithms. The characteristics of the real-world datasets are illustrated in Table 2 .
1) SYNTHETIC DATA
Two synthetic datasets are used to measure the effectiveness of CrossSpot+ against CrossSpot with listwise deletion over a variety of severities in incompleteness. The background noise in the tensor is generated using the Erdös-Rényi-Poisson model. Then, we inject a dense block into the tensor with a higher density on a subset of values on each variable. To simulate partially paired or incomplete data, we uniformly make a value of a variable on the tensor unknown with probability parameter p. On a k-variable dataset, this gives the probability of an entry being complete at (1 − p) k .
2) DoS ATTACK DATA
This dataset is used to evaluate CrossSpot+ on the particularly relevant application of security. The dataset was attained by combining UDP traffic from a controlled DoS attack conducted by the University of California Los Angeles 1 with UDP traff ic traced by the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab [30] . The dataset contains three variables: time (in seconds), source IP, and destination IP. We uniformly make values unknown at random on multiple degrees of severity to simulate incomplete data of varying severity. Having ground truth on which packets are truly suspicious will enable us to calculate the accuracy of the algorithms.
3) TWITTER DATA
Two datasets containing tweets 2 are used as partially paired multimodal datasets. They are partly geolocated, indicating the merging of two modes: Twitter streaming data and available geolocational data. The first dataset contains tweets containing the Google stock symbol ($GOOG), collected for one month from around the world. The second includes global tweets containing the Yahoo! stock symbol ($YHOO), also collected over a month. We search for dense subblocks and compare the mass and size of those returned by each competing metric and algorithm.
B. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Both CrossSpot+ and CrossSpot were implemented in Python and run on a Windows 10 machine with a 3.7 GHz Intel Xeon E5-1630 v4 processor and 64 GB of RAM. When ground truth is available, the returned blocks are evaluated by their precision, recall and F1 score. Precision is defined as the ratio of correctly identified suspicious events over the predicted number of suspicious events while recall is the ratio of correctly identified suspicious events over the actual number of suspicious events. F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. When ground truth is not available, we evaluate the size and mass of returned blocks between the two algorithms.
C. SYNTHETIC DATA
Two synthetic datasets are generated to test the abilities of the algorithms to detect suspicious activity even in ''adverse conditions.'' In the first, we generate a k = 2 tensor of size 1000×1000 and mass 10,000. A suspicious block of size 30×30 and mass 512 is then injected. In the second, a k = 3 tensor of size 1000×1000×1000 and mass 10,000 is generated, and a block of size 30×30×30 and mass 512 is injected. The algorithms are run on various levels of simulated incompleteness. Each algorithm is run with 100 random seed blocks of size 10×10, and the top F1 score is returned. The results are given in Tables 3 and 4. It is observed that CrossSpot+ increasingly outperforms CrossSpot as the level of incompleteness increases, particularly in the 3-variable dataset. At 25% incompleteness, which is rather tame in the context of merged multimodal data from different sources, CrossSpot+ posts over a 30000% improvement, and at 50% incompleteness it is still able to capture around 75% of suspicious events at near perfect precision, even when CrossSpot with listwise deletion effectively finds nothing. CrossSpot+ performs slower, but this can be attributed to the fact that the runtime is highly dependent on the size of the blocks found. At 0% incompleteness (when the tensors are identical), the 2-variable dataset saw only a 2% increase in runtime from CrossSpot to CrossSpot+ while in the 3-variable dataset, CrossSpot+'s runtime increased 17% over CrossSpot.
For higher numbers of modes and variables the synthetic datasets indicate that CrossSpot+ is increasingly necessary. This is supported by theory; as k increases, The likelihood that an entry is complete (1 − p) k decreases and listwise deletion becomes less viable. Fortunately CrossSpot+ shows it can still detect suspicious blocks with high accuracy in such cases by using the information it does have.
D. DoS ATTACK
With ground truth on the suspiciousness of a packet in a UDP flood attack, we have a rare opportunity to decisively measure the accuracy of the algorithms on a real dataset. The data is a single-mode, 3-variable dataset, and incompleteness is introduced to measure its impact on the algorithms. The top F1 score returned from 100 random seed blocks of size 10×10 are recorded, and Table 5 illustrates the results.
Amazingly, CrossSpot+ exhibits near perfect recall even with 90% incompleteness. In other words, only 0.1% of entries are complete, but the algorithm still manages to identify 99.3% of the suspicious events. In the same conditions, CrossSpot with listwise deletion is only able to recover 0.1% of such events. The relatively gaudy figures can be attributed to the strong contrast between the Denial of Service attack and the background activity, but this is not unusual of DoS attacks that must overwhelm servers with far greater loads than typical.
E. TWITTER
Two sets of tweets from Twitter, each logged over a month, are combed for large, dense blocks. The Twitter data is partially geolocated, representing the merging of two modes that are only partially paired. Table 6 illustrates the size and mass of the top 3 most suspicious blocks found by each algorithm with 100 random seed blocks of size 10×10. The average suspiciousness of the returned blocks is also reported.
The results show that CrossSpot+ is able to find much larger and much more massive blocks in both datasets. The average suspiciousness of blocks found using CrossSpot+ is close to 3 times that of CrossSpot in the Google stock data, and over 50 times in the Yahoo! stock data.
F. DISCUSSIONS
While the success of CrossSpot+ in dealing with partially paired and incomplete data is encouraging, we see a couple avenues for improvement. The assumption that an unknown value on a dimension belong to the subset of values for that dimension in the subtensor is generally effective, but it may too tolerant and detrimental to precision, as can be witnessed to some degree in Table 5 . Future work may focus on the use of probability of membership in the subset of values to introduce a more moderate contribution by partially paired entries to the suspiciousness of a subtensor. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the problem of detecting suspicious blocks in multimodal data, even when the data is incomplete. This is a common case arising from the merging of data from different sources when not all events are described by all datasets. We proposed a metric for scoring the suspiciousness of blocks in a multimodal tensor and showed that it satisfied the axioms delineating an effective metric as put forward by previous research as well as an additional axiom proposed by us for partially paired data. Furthermore, we presented CrossSpot+, an algorithm adapted from Jiang et al.'s CrossSpot for uncovering groups of suspicious events in incomplete or partially paired multimodal data. Experimental results suggest that CrossSpot+ is effective for handling such data, posting significantly better results than CrossSpot with listwise deletion.
